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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with two issues: development of 
some advanced smart grid applications, and 
implementation of advanced testbeds to evaluate these 
applications. In each of the development cases, the role 
of the testbeds is explained and evaluation results are 
presented. The applications cover the synchrophasor 
systems, interfacing of microgrids to the main grid, 
and cybersecurity solutions. The paper hypothesizes 
that the use of the advanced testbeds is beneficial for 
the development process since the solution product-to-
market cycle may be shortened due to early real-life 
demonstrations. In addition, solution users’ feedback 
to the testbed demonstration can be incorporated at an 
early stage when making the changes is not as costly 
as doing it at more mature development stages.   
 
1. Introduction  
      
In last few decades, smart grid emerged as a 
solution to fulfill the need to facilitate connection of 
renewable energy resources to reduce the carbon 
footprint compared to legacy fossil fuel plants [1]. 
Smart grid protection, monitoring, and control tasks are 
improved by adding system-wide monitoring and 
control capabilities through synchrophasor systems [2]. 
In addition, smart grid allows interfacing of the legacy 
grid with microgrids, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, 
and energy storage [3]. As a result of such technology 
deployments, there is a growing concern about 
cybersecurity and privacy of smart grid solutions [4]. 
The practical approach to study impacts of such 
advancements on the power grid is through 
implementing proper testbeds, so to avoid the 
demonstrations interfering with actual power systems 
operation. New generation testbeds are designed and 
implemented using actual power system control 
equipment interfaced with actual grid and/or 
simulation software to allow replication of full-scale 
cyber-physical system performance at a large 
laboratory scale. Several papers addressed the 
development of the power system cyber-physical 
testbeds [5-17]. In [5-9], concept of end to end testing 
using the system in-the-loop (SIL) testbed is presented. 
In [10-15], hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) testing 
platforms for different studies including distributed 
generation and power electronic interfaces are 
discussed. Examples of cyber-physical testbeds to 
study different concerns related to power system cyber-
attacks can be found in [16, 17]. These papers describe 
the testbed setup but quite often do not elaborate on the 
full benefits of large-scale testbed concept.  
Our paper describes the following three testbeds 
and elaborates on their benefits. 
The system-in-the loop (SIL) testbed is used to 
evaluate a new synchrophasor based fault location (FL) 
application [18]. The full-scale end-to-end 
synchrophasor testbed allows evaluation of the FL 
algorithm under real power grid operating conditions, 
and its robustness can be quantified under various 
failures in the synchrophasor infrastructure.  
A real-time simulation platform for hardware-in-
the-loop evaluation of distribution-level microgrid 
controllers is developed and implemented in [19]. The 
proposed solution turns an offline power system 
simulation tool into an online tool by wrapping it with 
the necessary timekeeping and interface algorithms, 
which can be used to test the performance of physical 
controllers.  
The Cyber-Physical Security (CPS) testbed is a co-
simulation platform that integrates real, simulated, and 
emulated components or subsystems [20, 21]. It is 
composed of three key components: (i) industry-grade 
SCADA, (ii) RTDS, Opal-RT for real-time digital 
simulation of power system, and (iii) a wide-area 
communication emulator for mimicking the channel 
characteristics of communication between substations 
and control center.  
A brief background of each testbed concept is 
explained in Section 2. In Sections 3, 4, and 5, the 
procedure to set up the SIL, HIL, and co-simulation  
testbed Use Cases is outlined, the hypothesis why the 
testbeds are beneficial and how the benefits can be 
achieved is stated, and  examples of the results of Use 
Case testing of fault location algorithm, renewable 
generation interfacing, and cybersecurity solutions are 
presented.   The conclusion with summary of 
contributions is given in Section 6. 
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Figure 1. Synchrophasor SIL testbed architecture 
2. Background  
      
The SIL testbed assumes that a control system and 
a physical system are tied together in an 
implementation that resembles the production 
environment of actual control systems. The only 
differentiation is that the SIL production environment 
is not connected to control actual power system but a 
system model instead. An example of an SIL for a 
synchrophasor testbed is shown in Figure 1.   
This production system is implemented using 
commercial products and instrumented to allow for 
new applications to be embedded and evaluated 
through interaction with the rest of the system 
components. It consists of multiple Phasor 
Measurement Units (PMU), substation and control 
center Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC), and a 
Software Defined Network (SDN) controller for 
emulation of different communication protocols and 
network features.  It contains a full suite of 
synchrophasor software from Alstom/GE, integrated 
with OSISoft PI historian and Esri GIS software. The 
input measurements come from three sources: actual 
network, real time simulator (OPAL-RT), and signal 
generator. The power system network is modeled after 
an actual power grid, so the test cases are scaled to a 
real-life application.  As elaborated later on in this 
paper, this testbed is used to evaluate a new fault 
location technique developed using measurements of 
the electromechanical wave propagations initiated by 
system faults [18].  
Figure 2 shows the overall structure of the proposed 
HIL simulation platform. This platform uses available 
commercial off-the-shelf components for an accurate 
and functional solution to evaluate the performance of 
a physical controller for microgrid applications. This 
solution has the added advantage of flexibility, 
affordability, and ease of use. The size of the system, 
number of I/O (input/output) signals, and the controller 
hardware can all be customized as needed based on the 
exact application. As discussed later in this paper, the 
setup developed in this work uses PSCAD/EMTDC as 
the simulation engine, NI LabVIEW as the hardware 
interface, and NI cRIO as the physical controller 
hardware.  
Figure 3 shows the architecture of the PowerCyber 
testbed that consists of SCADA hardware/software 
with emulation and simulation capabilities that include 
substation automation system (Siemens SICAM PAS), 
control center software (Siemens Power TG), SCADA 
and substation communication protocols (DNP3, IEC 
61850, IEEE C37.118), and security technologies 
(Scalance: Firewall, VPN), four multifunction 
protection relays (7SJ610, 7SJ82), three SEL 421 
PMUs and a Phasor Data Concentrator (PDC) to 
provide a realistic electric grid cyber infrastructure. 
Power system simulations are performed using real-
time digital simulators such as RTDS and Opal-RT and 
using DIgSILIENT PowerFactory software for non-
real time analysis.  
The testbed employs virtualization technologies to 
address scalability concerns and reduce development 
cost. The testbed has also been integrated with the 
Internet Scale Event and Attack Generation 
Environment (ISEAGE) [22] to provide wide-area 
network emulation and advanced attack simulation. 
The testbed uses cyber-attack tools such as nmap, 
WireShark, and Nessus for cyber security and attack-
defense experimentations. The testbed provides a 
cyber-physical power grid environment wherein 
realistic experiments on wide area monitoring, wide 
area control, wide-area protection (WAMPAC), and 
distributed decision making in the smart grid can be 
carried out.  The testbed is being utilized for carrying 
out three main research tasks: (a) vulnerability analysis 
in the cyber layer; (b) impact analysis due to successful 
cyber-attacks; and (c) cyber security validations and 
attack-defense evaluation studies to evaluate the 
effectiveness of security measures [21]. 
 
Figure 2. Overall structure of the proposed 
software-based HIL simulation platform 
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3. SIL testbed use for developing and 
evaluating synchrophasor fault location 
application 
  
In the last two decades, availability of synchronized 
measurements utilizing PMU devices has become a 
turning point in power system monitoring, protection 
and control [23]. In this section, we use the SIL 
synchrophasor testbed to evaluate a newly proposed 
fault location method in realistic field conditions. 
 
3.1. Application development 
  
Faults occur in power system due to reasons 
including extreme weather condition and vegetation, 
animal or human contacts. Once protective relays send 
trip command to circuit breakers to clear the fault, the 
location of fault must be determined to facilitate 
troubleshooting and minimize restoration time [24].  
Following a fault on a transmission line, powerflow 
re-routes in the power system, and triggers a mismatch 
between generators’ electrical and mechanical torques 
which are located in the vicinity of fault. To 
compensate the mismatch, each generator rotor angle 
changes with regard to its reference angle which results 
in powerflow redistribution. Similarly, the adjacent 
generators’ rotor angles start slipping against their 
reference angle to compensate the mismatch. In this 
manner, the oscillation known as “electromechanical 
wave” propagates through the entire network [25].  
These electromechanical waves travel through 
different paths with limited speed (compared to 
electromagnetic one) and arrive at remote buses with 
specific time delays, which could be detected by 
monitoring phasor angle at PMU locations in the 
system. Since propagation delay depends solely on the 
network parameters, Dijkstra's shortest path algorithm 
can be deployed to build a database of propagation 
delays between different buses of the system. The 
proposed fault location method detects Time of Arrival 
(ToA) of electromechanical waves at different PMU 
locations using first and second derivative of phase 
angle signal. Then determines the faulty line using an 
optimization algorithm that minimizes the norm of 
accumulative error between actual measured delay and 
calculated error from the database. Once the faulty line 
is detected, the fault location is calculated within the 
faulty line using binary search algorithm [19].  
To evaluate the performance of such application 
prior to deployment in the field, one has to represent a 
complex power system and to take into account various 
data quality issues in the synchrophasor infrastructure. 
It allows verifying the performance of application in 
the conditions very similar to what is found in the field. 
 
3.2. Testbed set up 
      
Figure 4 shows the configuration of the SIL testbed 
for evaluation of fault location application. The testbed 
is implemented using various commercial solutions 
acquired through partnership agreements with major 
 
Figure 3. PowerCyber CPS Testbed 
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vendors in this area, such as Opal-RT, OsiSoft and 
several PMU vendors.   
The evaluation using the testbed configuration 
shown in Figure 4 allows the users to do the following: 
 Run real-time simulation of different power system 
models and studies (such as faults, load or 
generation outage and topology control) with Opal-
RT simulator. The RT-LAB software suite is the 
connection point between software and hardware 
parts of the SIL system.    
 Send voltage/current signals through Opal-RT 
analog I/O board and scale them with power 
amplifiers. RT-LAB software suite allows 
employing virtual PMUs within software and 
directly sends PMU streams via C37.118 protocols 
to PDC.  
 Measure phasor (GPS synchronized) values of 
signals using PMUs from different vendors. 
 Collecting phasors from PMUs using substation 
PDC. 
 Transfer substation PDC data to OpenPDC (control 
center PDC) using SDN, which allows simulation 
of different communication system failures (such as 
latency and data loss). 
 Archive phasor data using PI-Historian server. 
 Perform fault location study on a complex system 
model which can better reflect actual field 
conditions. Evaluate performance of fault location 
application by comparing its output results with the 
input fault scenarios inserted with SIL simulations.   
Figure 5 shows the physical connection of SIL 
synchrophasor testbed equipment/software setup.  
 
3.3 Use-Case 1: Impact of power system 
 
The fault location application is initially tested 
using IEEE118 bus test system [19]. The SIL testbed 
makes it possible to test FL method with various 
scenarios such as changing fault specifications, size 
(number of buses, type of lines), and system operating 
conditions prior to or during fault. The test using actual 
size system from a utility interested in the 
implementation is underway.  
A summary of results for a few test cases with 
different fault specifications is listed in Table I.  The 
proposed method correctly detects fault type and in 
most of cases locates fault point within error of 1%.  
Figure 6 depicts the phasor angle captured by four 
closest PMUs to the fault point of case 6 from Table I 
(to keep it readable). From Figure 7, it can be seen that 
the electromechanical wave oscillation following the 
fault (a-g with 20Ω at 0.9 pu from bus 19) on line 19-
20 is first detected at bus 21 at t=5.43 sec and then 
detected at buses 15, 23 and 17, respectively. 
 
3.4 Use-Case 2: Impact of PMU/PDC failure 
 
Capability of deploying virtual PMUs using the SIL 
testbed makes it viable to study effect of unavailability 
of PMU streams on evaluation of the FL method. The 
average error of the method vs. total number of out of 
 
Figure 4. SIL testbed configuration for FL evaluation 
 
 
Figure 5. SIL synchrophasor testbed physical setup 
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service PMUs in each area is depicted in Figure 7. To 
perform this study, once each PMU is taken out of 
service, an a-g fault with 1Ω resistance is inserted at 
the middle of 20 different lines at each of the three 
areas and average error percentage is used for plotting. 
Figure 7 shows that the method remains accurate under 
the circumstance that five PMUs in each area are out of 
service. 
3.5 Use-Case 3: Impact of PMU data quality 
issues 
 
The SDN controller within SIL testbed makes it 
possible to test robustness of the FL method vs. PMU 
bad data by emulating communication error including 
packet delay, packet loss, and channel failure. Figure 8 
shows the average error of the algorithm once PMU 
streams are affected. In scenario 1, PMU streams in 
area 1 are emulated with random packet delay in the 
range of 20ms. An a-g fault with 1Ω resistance is 
inserted at the middle of 20 different lines at each of 
the three areas, and the average error in each area is 
obtained (first three columns of Figure 8 from left). It 
can be observed that the effect of PMU bad data is felt 
when the fault is occurred in the same area as the 
affected PMUs. The same is concluded from second 
and third scenarios where the PMUs in area 2 and area 
3 are emulated, respectively.  
4.  HIL testbed use for developing and 
evaluating microgrid controller 
applications  
 
Microgrids have emerged as a potential building 
block for the smart gird to enable effective, modular, 
and efficient integration of renewable energy resources 
in the host power system. A microgrid can operate as a 
standalone system, thereby increasing the resiliency 
and reliability of the power system in case of high-
impact events. In recent years, several testbeds have 
been developed at universities and industries around 
the world. An example is our testbed that includes a 
transmission-level control center, a distribution-level 
operating center, substation and distribution feeder 
automation facilities, software models of renewable 
energy devices, and smart meters.  
This section discusses the recent additions to this 
testbed to allow hardware-in-the-loop real-time 
simulation of distribution-level microgrid systems. 
 
Figure 7. Fault location error vs. PMUs out of service  
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Figure  8. Effect of PMU bad data on fault location 
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This tool enables evaluation of control strategies 
beyond what is possible with a mere software-based 
solution before they are implemented in the field. 
Otherwise, after field implementation, additional 
modifications and tuning can be costly. 
 
4.1. Application development  
 
Similar to an active distribution system, a microgrid 
includes several components, e.g., distributed energy 
resources (DER), capacitors, controllable loads, and 
power electronic devices. In many cases, each of these 
devices is controlled by a local controller [26], [27], 
which is supervised by a central controller [28], [29]. 
Design of these controllers is key to stable, reliable, 
and optimal operation of the system [30]. This design 
needs to be 
(1) Evaluated via simulation studies in tools such as 
MATLAB/Simulink [31], PSCAD/EMTDC [32], 
and DigSILENT PowerFactory [33]. In this case, 
both the microgrid and the controllers are 
implemented in the simulation environment [34]. 
(2) Validated via hardware implementation. In this 
case, as discussed in this paper, the control 
algorithm is implemented in the same physical 
hardware that will eventually implement the 
controllers in the field. 
The solution developed for this application is 
discussed in the following subsections.  
 
4.2. Testbed setup 
 
Figure 2 (on page 2) shows the schematic diagram 
of the developed software-based hardware-in-the-loop 
simulation platform. This platform has four main 
components: 1) a power system simulator, 2) a 
hardware interface, 3) a physical controller, and 4) the 
synchronization and coordination logic. In this paper, 
PSCAD/EMTDC is employed for simulation of the 
power system due to its flexibility, high speed, 
extensibility, and wide acceptance in the industry for 
electromagnetics-type transients simulation. The 
physical controller in this case is the National 
Instrument (NI) cRIO. NI cRIO is a robust, industry-
grade controller capable of executing very fast control 
commands in its FPGA or efficient processing in its 
CPU. Since NI cRIO is used to implement the 
controller logic, the natural choice for the interface is 
LabVIEW (also developed by NI). LabVIEW 
interfaces to a data acquisition (DAQ) module that 
communicates with the external controller. However, 
PSCAD and LabVIEW cannot natively communicate 
with each other. Therefore, text files are employed as 
the interface media between these two software tools. 
Each measurement is written to a separate file. A 
custom PSCAD component (Figure 9) reads from these 
text files the data written by LabVIEW; similarly, 
another custom PSCAD component writes to another 
set of text files, which are then read by LabVIEW. 
Other methods of interfacing, e.g., using ports, can be 
employed for achieving an even higher speed of 
communication; however, this work does not further 
investigate their application. LabVIEW reads the 
PSCAD output files and writes their contents to the 
output channels of the DAQ module. The external 
controller then reads the data from the DAQ module. 
While the read/write operations on a file add a certain 
overhead to the simulation, this overhead is accounted 
for using the synchronization algorithm as discussed 
below. 
Figure 10 shows the timeline for real-time 
operation enforcement. Real-time simulation is 
enforced by ensuring that PSCAD runs neither faster 
nor slower than real time. To avoid slower-than-real-
time simulation, based on the available hardware, the 
simulation time step and the plot time step of PSCAD 
 
Figure 9. Custom PSCAD component for interfacing 
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Figure 10. Timeline of the proposed real-time 
simulation 
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are selected sufficiently large and the rate of 
communication with the controller device (that is, 
read/write operations) is selected sufficiently low. To 
avoid faster-than-real-time simulation, a Fortran code 
compares the simulation time with the real time and 
introduces a delay if the simulation time is ahead of 
real time. (Fortran language is used because it is the 
native programming language for developing new 
components in PSCAD; in general other programming 
languages, including MATLAB and C, can also be 
used and linked to PSCAD.) After a certain number of 
simulation time steps, PSCAD communicates with the 
controller device. After the communication process, 
the simulation time and the real time are compared and 
the algorithm mentioned earlier is called to enforce 
real-time simulation. 
 
4.3 Use-Case 1: Validation of Real-Time 
Simulation 
 
To evaluate the performance of the proposed 
software-based HIL real-time simulator, an 
experimental setup is developed. As shown in Figure 
11, the power system is simulated in PSCAD (right 
hand side of the computer screen), which is run side by 
side with LabVIEW (left side of the computer screen). 
PSCAD communicates with LabVIEW via text files, 
and LabVIEW communicates with the physical 
controller (NI cRIO) via DAQ modules. The 
oscilloscope is used to capture the measured 
waveforms. Figure 12 shows the test microgrid, which 
includes three switched loads and two switched 
capacitors. The loads can be manually switched on and 
off. The control objective is to maintain the voltages of 
the buses of capacitors C1 and C2 within the specified 
limits by appropriate capacitor switching when the 
loads change. This logic is implemented in the NI 
cRIO controller. 
Figure 13 shows the difference between the 
simulation time and the real time for the test microgrid 
without and with real time enforcing scheme. Without 
real-time enforcement, the simulation runs faster than 
the realtime and the difference between the two 
increases linearly with time. With the proposed real-
time enforcement scheme, the difference between the 
real time and the simulation time is always maintained 
around zero. 
Figure 12. Test microgrid in grid-connected mode 
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Figure 13. Difference between the simulation time and the 
real time of a sample simulation case study without and 
with the proposed real-time enforcing scheme. 
 
4.4 Use-Case 2: Maintaining Voltage at 
Capacitor Buses with Load Switching 
 
In this scenario, the ability of the proposed HIL 
architecture as well as the control system to maintain 
the voltages of the system within the desired levels as 
system loads change is evaluated. To observe the 
physical signals, as shown in Figure 14, an 
oscilloscope is used to monitor the desired simulation 
variables. Figure 15 shows the PSCAD simulation 
results without and with the controller device 
interfaced to the simulator. Prior to switching the loads 
on (at t = 70 s), the bus voltages are within the defined 
limits (
1 2
[0.98,0.995],   [0.99,0.998] C CV V ). When 
the load increases, the voltages of both buses decrease. 
 
Figure 11. Setup of the proposed software-based HIL 
real-time simulation 
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Without the external controller, the voltages of both 
buses decrease significantly, as shown in Figure 15(a)-
top. With the external controller interfaced to PSCAD, 
when the feeder load increases, the controller regulates 
the voltages of these buses, Figure 15(a)-bottom. 
Figure 15 (b) shows the voltages of the same buses as 
measured by an oscilloscope. Figures 15(a) and (b) use 
the same scales for horizontal and vertical axes. 
Equivalence of the time scales of PSCAD plot 
(simulation time) and the oscilloscope (real time) 
validates the effectiveness of the proposed real-time 
enforcement scheme. 
 
5. CPS testbed use for developing and 
evaluating cybersecurity applications  
 
The PowerCyber has automated front-end and 
back-end to support remote access to the testbed. The 
experimentation framework has been implemented 
using story-board based approach that enables defining 
both power and cyber system topologies and 
configuring both attacks and defense measures. Figure 
16 shows the web-based front-end of the testbed for 
remote access [35]. This implementation facilitates 
ease of use for a versatile community of users with 
different expertise and also serves as an educational 
platform that allows users to learn about the 
importance and criticality of cyber security of critical 
infrastructures such as smart grid. The remote access 
framework supports the following story board 
constructs focusing on WAMPAC applications.  
 
5.1 Use-Case 1: Cascading outage through a 
coordinated cyber attack on power system’s 
wide-area protection scheme [21] 
 
In this scenario (depicted in Figure 17), the attack 
involves a combination of two coordinated attack 
actions on a power system protection scheme known as 
Remedial Action Scheme (RAS). Typically, RAS is 
intended to take specific protective measures to prevent 
the spread of large disturbances under heavy system 
loading conditions. However, an attacker could 
intelligently trigger the operation of this RAS by 
creating a data integrity attack on unencrypted 
communication between the substation and the control 
center (or by performing a replay attack if the 
communication channel is encrypted) that uses the 
DNP3 protocol. In order to create a cascading outage, 
the attacker also blocks the communication between 
the protection relays that are involved in the RAS 
through a targeted Denial of Service (DoS) attack on 
one of the protection controllers. In this example, first 
line outage is caused by tripping the relay between Bus 
B7-B5 and simultaneously a DoS attack is performed 
on the RAS Controller or its communication channel 
 
Figure 14. Using an oscilloscope for observing the single 
phase voltage of a bus 
 
Figure 15. HIL real-time simulation results: (a) readings 
of PSCAD plots; (b) measurements of the physical 
oscilloscope. From top to bottom: Voltages of the 
capacitor buses when the external controller is not 
interfaced to the simulation and both capacitors are 
switched off; and voltages of the capacitor buses when 
the external controller is interfaced to the simulation. 
 
Figure 17. Coordinated attack on RAS (9-bus) 
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preventing its “ramp down” command not reaching 
Generation Controller of G2. This prevents the 
successful operation of the RAS and in turn initiates 
secondary protection to be tripped to avoid thermal 
overload on the impacted transmission line (B7-B8). 
As a result of this coordinated attack involving data 
integrity attack to trip a breaker and a DoS attack on 
RAS communications, the overall system frequency is 
also affected as it causes the islanding of a generator 
(G2) from the rest of the system.  
 
5.2 Use-Case 2: Manipulating Automatic 
Generation Control (AGC) measurements 
and/or controls to affect system frequency [36] 
 
In this scenario, the attack involves a stealthy 
manipulation of measurements/controls used in 
Automatic Generation Control (AGC) algorithm to 
destabilize and affect the frequency of the power grid. 
This attack is a version of the classic Man-In-The-
Middle (MitM) attack, where the attacker intercepts the 
communication between the control center and the 
remote substations (forward communication) and 
chooses to stealthily modify the frequency and/or tie-
line measurements going to the control center, or the 
AGC control commands going to the generating 
stations (reverse communication). For example, 
manipulating the forward communication is achieved 
by executing an ARP (Address Resolution Protocol) 
poisoning attack first, which tricks the remote 
substation to forward the data to the attacker before 
sending it to the external gateway at the control center. 
The attacker then selects targeted information 
(measurements) that is to be manipulated and modifies 
it maliciously using custom attack scripts and forwards 
it to the control center gateway. As a result of this 
manipulation, the AGC algorithm ends up computing 
wrong Area Control Error (ACE) values that cause the 
generators to ramp up or ramp down in the wrong 
direction. As a result, there will be a steady deviation 
in system frequency, which will trigger shedding of 
some loads in an attempt to restore the frequency. In 
summary, a sustained stealthy attack could potentially 
lead to a major load shedding, which in turn could also 
trigger cascading events. 
The testbed has been used for impact 
characterization of AGC algorithm over a multi-area 
system and also for evaluating the effectiveness of 
mitigation algorithms, such as firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems, and model-based anomaly detection 
that utilizes cyber-physical system properties. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
As a result of the work presented, the following are 
the contributions: 
 It has been demonstrated that the use of testbeds 
offers new opportunities to develop more robust 
solutions that can be evaluated under realistic 
conditions well ahead of their implementation in a 
production system, which saves the time and cost 
of development and deployment. 
 SIL testbed has been invaluable in testing new FL 
application since it enabled end-to-end evaluation 
of the various implementation impacts on the FL 
error such as power system scale, management of 
PMU/PDC measurement, and handling of data 
quality issues.   
 HIL real-time simulation can be a valuable step, 
after offline simulation, when evaluating the 
performance of controllers within a microgrid, 
which otherwise is hard to evaluate using only the 
conventional modeling and simulation methods. 
 CPS security testbeds are enabling technologies 
that have the potential to accelerate R&D, 
education and training in smart grid security by 
providing realistic platforms for system-scale as 
well as component-specific experiments pertaining 
to vulnerability assessment, impact analysis, 
security validations, attack-defense evaluations, 
and forensic analysis.  
 The testbeds also enable bridging the gap between 
academic research and industry practice and can 
contribute to workforce development in this 
growing area of importance.  
 From a technical point of view, architecting a 
modular CPS testbed for smart grid with support 
for scalability and programmability is in its early 
stages and hence significant further research needs 
to be done. 
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